In a general view, it seems that Islamism movement in Jordan does not have unique identity, and includes Ekhvan Al Moslemin, Salafi Jihadism and Takfiri and small moderate movements such as ALVASAT PARTY. The main purpose of this paper is deeper review of Islamism movement in Jordan, effort for identification of Islamist political parties in Jordan, their arrangement in political scene, their internal mental challenges, and their positioning to each other.

At present, one of the pillars claimed to be capable of empowering a country's political system is the existence of political parties. Parties, especially in countries with a secular worldview, have so far performed well because there is a convergence of political worldview between the PARTY and PARTY activists in the community that facilitates the process of political development from the point of view of Western scholars. This research is an attempt to analyze and compare the parties' intellectual and paradigmatic foundations with the interviews of the activists of the three post-revolutionary parties (mitalefe eslami, kargozaran, rohaniat mobarez ). The statistical population of the study is all parties registered in the Ministry until 1397. The two parties were elected according to elite opinion. The method of analysis is qualitative content analysis by maxqdo 12 software. The results show thatThe results show that the PARTY document is not in line with the interviews with PARTY activists and We see the paradigmatic confusion in the document and the interview of the PARTY activists. None of the parties has used a specific paradigm. Of course, the intellectual foundations used in the parties all have a secular approach that is incompatible with the notions of the Islamic system and the intellectual and practical aims of the Islamic Revolution.

In Dispute among different persons having common interest, issuances of judgement to the loss of one of the plaintiff’s doesnot lose the rights of other plaintiffs. For this reason, objection by third PARTY is not needed. In Dispute among defendants having common interest, if the judgment issued against one of the defendants and from the result of that judgment is used to the loss of other defendant, loss of created to the their rights and to delete induced loss, it should be protest to the that judgment. Because issuance of orders doednot loss to the third parties, orders are not protestable by third PARTY. In case of accepting third allegation, desition of court is to the form of judgment. Since court cannot contraditts main claim in case of order, there isnot possibility of formal objection to the main claim by third protester.

The increase in litigation costs, including court costs, attorneys' fees, expert's fees, etc., has made access to justice challenging for some people. Therefore, potential claimants turn to existing tools, including third-PARTY litigation funding (TPLF), to cover these costs. In TPLF, the third-PARTY funder, who is not originally a PARTY to the suit, finances the PARTY’, s litigation costs in return for a share of the proceeds of the court verdict or settlement. Although the TPLF can meet the needs of some people to cover the costs of litigation, due to its infancy, it brings with it major challenges. Challenges have different dimensions and involve the judicial system as well as TPLF actors, including imposing a high rate of return on the funded PARTY, funding frivolous lawsuits, control of litigation by the third-PARTY funder, Problems with disclosure, breach of confidentiality, and Inadequacy of capital and many other challenges. The Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception to these challenges. Allowing TPLF in the absence of regulatory bodies and governing regulations, in addition to creating the above fundamental challenges for the funded PARTY and the other PARTY to the dispute, can lead to increase problems in the judicial system.

Political parties in current democracies are considered as the fundamental institutions which have various functions such as expressing the will of citizens, forming awareness, introducing the election candidates and providing the government’s future plans. In recent decades, due to the reluctance among people for joining political parties, their financial resources have decreased. Therefore financing parties from state resources has been put forward as an alternative but such idea has faced oppositions. This article introduces the direct and indirect general financing programs of political parties and also examines opponents and adherents views in descriptive and analytical manner as well as the necessity of parties’ financing. The finding of this contribution indicates that protection and safeguarding of human rights, legitimacy and effectiveness of the government, depends on state aids to the parties.

The principle of PARTY-disposition (or what is called “Le Principe Dispositif” in the French Law) is one of the Guiding Principles for Civil Trial. According to this Principle, the civil proceeding is regarded as the parties’s thing, so they can make any disposition on their proceeding, inter alia they are be able to commence and terminate it, determine the matters of fact and finally judge is bound to the parties’s motions. The effects and development of the Principle has greatly been considerable in so far as it has been presented as one of the common values of the world’s legal culture. For this reason, The Principles of Transnational Civil procedure – the common project of ALI & UNDROIT- has provided for this principle in it’s tenth Principle.

"Third PARTY Ownership" is one of the restraint of Trade Law in Sport, whereby a third PARTY acquires all or part of the player's economic rights for financing the player or injecting cash into the club. Contrary to  the common perception in the field, this mechanism does not grant the decision-making power of the contract to a third PARTY, and therefore, this will not lead to a type of slavery or curtail a player’s freedom. As the result, it will not result in the third PARTY’s interference in implementation of the contract which is in breach of Article 960 of the Civil Code and Article 18 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In practice, various countries adopted different approached to the validity of this mechanism. The present study shows that by relying on economic efficiency and justice this mechanism merely entitles a third PARTY to the player’s incomes in his future transfers without any unfair wealth transfer to third parties. FIFA regulations do not prohibit any investment by a third PARTY, but they have banned him from influencing over club’s decisions. The mechanism could be introduced as a business model for football.

Justice and Development PARTY pretended as an inclusive PARTY through showing a democratic and pragmatic character in the political stage of Turkey. The AK PARTY government managed to overcome social cleavages of turkey which is rooted in history and draw various social and political currents' attention via dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policy of Turkey and increase the number of fans in the national and local elections. But, since late 2000s the AK PARTY could become stable and capture the centers of power "Period of Authoritarianism" of the PARTY started in Turkey which resulted in severe changes in its policies. Leaving inter-PARTY democracy behind, measured elimination of Erdogan's opponents from the PARTY's leadership, efforts for changing people's lifestyles and adopting a religious young generation and neglecting "Zero problems with Neighbors" policy are of the changes in the period.In this paper, we investigate the face off of  Justice and Development PARTY from an inclusive PARTY to an authoritarian personalistic one and will answer this question: What are the results of authoritarian goverance of AK PARTY for Turkish society and its impact in reviving social cleavages in the country?

One of the modernistic achievements of Constitution Revolution was the obvious appearance and existence of the civil institutions such as the political associations and parties in Qajar Period. Soleiman Mirza was one of the few constitutionalist nobles who had widespread relations with the civil institutions. Participating in the establishment of semi-leftist Democrat PARTY and two Socialist and mass leftist parties, and being the leader of the mentioned parties not only was considered as actionist famous people of the parties in political arena of Iran but also there would be a question in mind that how a Qajar noble is in the top of the mentioned parties. Could we distinguish between the traditionalist nature based on the individualism and the modernist nature based on the pluralist rationale parties and could we consider him as its climax? The present article tries to consider the social status of Soleiman Mirza and to reach a strategy in order to explore the convergent and divergent positions between his political actions and situations in status of being leadership in Democrat and Socialist Parties.